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Abstract
Reydon and Scholz raise doubts about the Darwinian status of organizational 
ecology by arguing that Darwinian principles are not applicable to 
organizational populations. Although their critique of organizational 
ecology’s typological essentialism is correct, they go on to reject the 
Darwinian status of organizational populations. This paper claims that the 
replicator-interactor distinction raised in modern philosophy of biology but 
overlooked for discussion by Reydon and Scholz provides a way forward. 
It is possible to conceptualize evolving Darwinian populations providing 
that the inheritance mechanism is appropriately specified. By this approach, 
adaptation and selection are no longer dichotomized, and the evolutionary 
significance of knowledge transmission is highlighted.
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1. Introduction
Inspired by population ecology and niche theory, organizational ecology 
was developed by Hannan and collaborators during the 1970s and 1980s 
to explain organizational diversity and the evolution of industry charac-
teristics. Noted for its successful application to all manner of organiza-
tions, organizational ecology spawned an abundance of empirical research 
in management and strategy (Burgelman 1991), jobs and routines (Miner 
1991), and industrial economics (Klepper 2002; Carroll and Hannan 
2000).
Unlike Nelson and Winter (1982), who notably underplayed the Darwinian 
influence in their evolutionary approach, Hannan and Freeman (1989) explic-
itly aligned themselves with Darwin’s theory. They embraced the Darwinian 
message that it is populations that partake in evolutionary processes, and they 
strongly rejected the traditional organization science approach, with its 
“Lamarckian” focus on organizational adaptation. The focus of their atten-
tion was on the dynamic, industry-shaping selection process.
It is this application of the selection process that has come under attack by 
philosophers of science Reydon and Scholz (2009).1  In a powerful critique, 
they argue that organizational ecology is not a Darwinian research program 
and, moreover, that organizational populations do not have what it takes to 
participate in evolutionary processes. This paper challenges Reydon and 
Scholz on both counts.
The problem with organizational ecology is that it lacks an inheritance 
mechanism. There is no explanation for how knowledge concerning adaptive 
solutions to survival problems gets passed on. Pointedly, however, while its 
authors openly acknowledge their failure to articulate its explanatory mecha-
nism, knowledge transmission is clearly presumed in the account. Accordingly, 
organizational ecology remains compatible with Darwinism and is more 
accurately described as an incomplete Darwinian account rather than a “non-
Darwinian” account. Indeed this highlights a crucial aspect of the debate here 
where opposition between the two positions is seen as incompatible versus 
incomplete Darwinism.
On the key question of the Darwinian status of organizational populations, 
Reydon and Scholz conclude from organizational ecology’s commitment to 
typological essentialism that organizational populations in general are not 
1See also Scholz and Reydon (2010).
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Darwinian. This author takes a different view. While abstract formulations 
may vary in their characterizations, scholars in philosophy of biology and 
elsewhere have convincingly demonstrated the generic nature of the core 
Darwinian principles of variation, inheritance (retention), and selection. 
Moreover, at a lower level of abstraction, generalized terms now exist that 
facilitate the conceptualization of Darwinian entities and processes in the 
socioeconomic domain. Through this prominent Darwinian formulation, it is 
now possible to speak of an inheritance mechanism in relation to knowledge 
transmission in the social arena and, accordingly, to speak in terms of evolv-
ing organizational populations.
Specifically, the important distinction between replicators and interactors 
(Hull 1988) now permits articulation of a Darwinian evolutionary selection pro-
cess for organization scientists. It will be shown here how this distinction untan-
gles the ontological and conceptual issues raised in Reydon and Scholz’s critique 
of organizational ecology and reveals theirs to be a rather narrow formulation of 
Darwinism. Drawing on these conceptual advances, in an outline sketch, this 
paper shows how organization scientists can finally begin to construct evolu-
tionary accounts that accommodate both selection and adaptation effects in the 
business world and account for the role of knowledge transmission.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of 
organizational ecology and outlines Reydon and Scholz’s critique. Section 3 
presents the main argument of the paper through discussion of the limitations 
of Reydon and Scholz’s position, followed by an elucidation of the advances 
in the philosophy of biology they do not discuss. Section 4 considers the 
importance of knowledge transmission for evolutionary accounts in the 
socioeconomic domain, and section 5 proposes the way forward for organi-
zational ecology via the replicator-interactor distinction. Section 6 concludes 
and suggests further lines of inquiry.
2. Organizational Ecology and Reydon and Scholz’s 
critique
The view that selection processes govern the dynamics of organizational diversity 
shades naturally into a Darwinian evolutionary position. (Hannan and Freeman 
1989, 17)
Mindful of the deliberative behavior and adaptive potential of the firm, the 
evolutionary position traditionally adopted by organizational scholars from 
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2The theory is attributed to the French evolutionist Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck (1809) 
because of his popularization of the idea of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. 
In this view, changes that are acquired during the lifetime of an organism and that 
result from interaction with its environment are changes that can be inherited by the 
offspring of that organism. In other words, phenotypic changes or “adaptations” are 
somehow transmitted to the organism’s genotype and subsequently passed on to the 
next generation in reproduction.
3Albeit that Lamarckism is discounted in biology, notwithstanding a controversial and 
minority view in biology to the contrary (Steel et al. 1998), which would not, in any case, 
affect the argument about the validity of Lamarckism in the social sphere.
biology is “Lamarckism”2 (Levitt and March 1988) or, more specifically, the 
idea of Lamarckian inheritance. This is because Lamarckism admits the pos-
sibility of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, in other words, within-
generation inheritance as opposed to intergenerational inheritance. Undeniably, 
the processes in the business world that involve individual organizations 
adjusting strategy, adapting to the prevailing conditions, changing their form, 
and going on to reproduce that new form are Lamarckian, as the term is gener-
ally understood by evolutionists (Mayr 1976).3
Note that “adaptation” here refers to adaptation of the individual organiza-
tion, not the population, to its environment. In biology, adaptation and natural 
selection are intertwined processes, and, thus, the technical term there has a 
very different meaning.
For Hannan and Freeman (1977, 1989), organization theorists have been 
misguided in their fixation with the individual organization and traditional 
Lamarckian adaptation explanations of the evolution of organizational 
forms. This encouraged a narrow “focal organization perspective” as well as 
unrealistic assumptions about the flexibility of firms and the adaptive capa-
bilities of managers. They argue that the analysis has been stymied by its 
lack of contextual environmental considerations and that causality has been 
misconstrued.
Hannan and Freeman sought to redress the balance by portraying organi-
zations as complex systems that in reality have strong limitations on flexibil-
ity and speed of response. They constructed a theory that they believe more 
properly accounts for the competitive industry environment of other organi-
zations and explains how “macro-social” forces (social, economic, political) 
affect their changing structures. In this view, the diversity of organizations is 
explained not through the strategic decision making of managers but through 
the recognition of these inertial pressures on organizations and the measure-
ment of “vital rates,” such as rates of founding and entry into a population, 
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4Which confusingly, while featuring the core Darwinian principles of variation, inheri-
tance, and selection, is labeled “Lamarckian” by its authors (Nelson and Winter 1982, 11).
5Again, note that Hannan and Freeman allude here to the firm-level “Lamarckian” 
understanding of adaptation.
the rate of change in strategy and structure, and the rate of failure or mortality 
(1989, 201). Since a broad social change can affect any one of these rates, it 
is these “macro-social” forces that shape organizational diversity and deter-
mine the characteristics of the population or industry.
In framing their agenda, Hannan and Freeman posed the question “Does 
change in major features of organizations over time reflect mainly adaptation 
or selection and replacement?” (1989, 13) and argued unreservedly for the 
latter. For organizational ecologists, “there is no reason to presume that the 
great structural variability among organizations reflects only or even primar-
ily adaptation” (1977, 930). Change in organizational forms is the result of 
selection processes operating on populations of “structurally inert” organiza-
tions. Thus, in contrast to Nelson and Winter’s influential evolutionary 
approach,4 Hannan and Freeman propose a “top-down” explanation of evolu-
tionary change that does not account for firm-level “adaptive” change. In 
other words, whereas the former acknowledge that population-level changes 
are also influenced by the variety brought about through mutations (learning, 
imitation, random errors), Hannan and Freeman see evolutionary change 
explained principally through the selection and retention of new organiza-
tional forms. Indeed, this selection bias brought about a significant reorienta-
tion of theory, involving a shift in focus from the individual firm to the 
population of firms as the proper unit of analysis
Coupled with assumptions of inertia and managerial irrelevance is the lim-
iting view that the prevailing variety for organizational ecology is traced to 
the variety of organizational forms at founding. Following Stinchcombe 
(1965) and the idea that cohorts of organizations are imprinted with social, 
cultural, and technical features common to the environment at founding and 
that these are highly resistant to change, Hannan and Freeman (1989, xiii) 
assert, in an extreme version of the Darwinian position, that “current charac-
teristics of populations of organizations reflect historical conditions at the 
time of founding rather than recent adaptations.”5  Accordingly, in pursuance 
of the diversity question “Why are there so many (or so few) kinds of organi-
zations?” (1977), organizational ecology focuses on differential rates of 
entry, or “births” (new founding, mergers, division of existing organiza tions), 
and exit, or “deaths” (disbanding, acquisition), for organizations, since most 
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variability in the core structures of organizations comes about through the 
creation of new organizations and the demise of existing ones (1989, 12). 
Other sources of variety, such as the learning and development that occur 
over the lifetime of individual firms, are not accounted for in the analysis. To 
be sure, adaptation is effectively decoupled from selection in this approach.
2.1. Reydon and Scholz’s Critique
Although presented as a Darwinian approach and widely acknowledged as 
such, philosophers of biology Reydon and Scholz (2009) argue that organiza-
tional ecology is not a Darwinian research program. In a paper that focuses 
on its flawed ontological foundations, they set out the reasons why organiza-
tional ecology’s explanatory strategy does not work.
Organizational ecology, Reydon and Scholz argue, is not evolution in the 
proper sense; it does not include any entities that actually evolve; there is no 
principal causal mechanism to explain diversity; and its selection process is 
not “Darwinian.” This ultimately means that it cannot explain organizational 
diversity. Significantly, as a result of their analysis, they come to the view, 
challenged here, that populations in general “do not have what it takes to 
participate in evolutionary processes” (408).
Reydon and Scholz clarify the complex and foundational ontological rea-
sons why, strictly speaking, organizational ecology cannot be classified as 
Darwinian. Their critique offers an incisive account of the contrast between 
the typological essentialism evidenced in organizational ecology and the lit-
tle-understood population thinking approach, which is indispensable for an 
evolutionary selection process. Accordingly, they demonstrate that the selec-
tion process portrayed in organizational ecology is not an instantiation of a 
Darwinian selection process and thus does not explain a Darwinian evolu-
tionary process.
Other notable merits of Reydon and Scholz’s critique include substantia-
tion of the claim that variation and inheritance are necessary conditions for 
the existence of Darwinian populations and the related claim that inheritance 
cannot be separated from selection. Indeed the main conceptual issues arising 
for applications of the core Darwinian principles to socioeconomic phenom-
ena are clearly identified.
In a review of these crucial aspects of evolutionary theory, it is shown 
below how the evolutionary dynamic in organizational ecology falls short of 
a Darwinian evolutionary selection process and highlights where this author 
is in agreement with Reydon and Scholz. This section is followed by an eval-
uation of the limitations of their position.
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6See Ariew (2008) for excellent elucidations of the contributions of Mayr and Sober 
to our understanding of population thinking.
7“For the typologist the type (eidos) is real and the variety an illusion, while for the 
populationist the type (average) is an abstraction and only the variation is real” Mayr 
(1976, reprinted in Sober 2006, 327).
Typological Essentialism versus Population Thinking. The foundational problem 
for organizational ecology emerges from the theory’s conceptualization of 
variety, the origin and replenishment of which it fails to account for in its 
typological view of organizational populations as “sets” or “classes,” which, 
by definition, cannot change. While Reydon and Scholz do not deny that 
populations thus conceived will display variation among types, they stress 
the critical difference in conceptualization of populations when it comes to 
explaining evolutionary change by Darwinian natural selection. In a response 
to Lemos (2009), who sought to defend the Darwinian credentials of organi-
zational ecology, they explain,
It is a mistake to define organizational populations typologically—as sets of 
organizations with a shared form—because this does not allow for the variation 
between the members of a population that is required for evolution to occur. 
(Scholz and Reydon 2010, 506)
On the contrary, in their elaboration of the variation and inheritance link, 
they explain that populations need to be defined in terms of “structural cohe-
sion” or “lineages.” Population thinking was a profound challenge to the 
typological essentialism that characterized the thinking of Darwin’s own era. 
This was committed to the notion of fixed, immutable, or ideal types and thus 
logically prevented the conceptualization of evolutionary change (Mayr 
1959).6 Through this approach, Darwin presented an entirely new way of 
thinking (Mayr 1976), creating a philosophical schism that was barely per-
ceived at the time and that even today is underappreciated by evolutionary 
scholars (Hull 1990; Scholz and Reydon 2010). Darwin dismissed the pre-
vailing analytical priority of representative types and introduced the popula-
tion thinking perspective that instead privileges variety, the critical source of 
change in evolving systems.
For essentialists, entities are grouped according to a fixed number of typi-
cal traits that describe their essence. The typical or average type is central to 
the analysis. For population thinkers, however, the emphasis is on variable 
populations of entities in which each individual entity is unique and variety is 
paramount.7
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In organizational ecology, organizational populations are conceived of as 
“sets” of organizations and are defined in terms of their “structural similari-
ties,” in other words, their shared properties and behaviors. Accordingly, 
organizational ecology is unable to express a Darwinian evolutionary pro-
cess. The problem with typological essentialism is that variations from type 
are perceived as deviations or noise in the system and are thus discounted in 
the analysis. Whereas with population thinking, variation serves as the 
essential fuel of evolutionary change, without which there could be no selec-
tion process. Reydon and Scholz explain the significance of this distinction 
(2009, 423):
The point, then, is that defining populations in terms of structural similarities 
cannot allow for evolutionarily significant variation in populations. Typologically 
defined populations can change to a limited extent and new varieties of existing 
basic forms can come into being, but no entirely novel forms can come into being 
in the population. Once an entirely novel form comes into being, it falls by 
definition outside the population, so the population has not evolved.
What Reydon and Scholz emphasize here is the critical role of variety as 
the driver of change in a natural selection process. The restrictive typological 
view of populations as sets of immutable types that exclude novel forms does 
not account for the requisite sustained replenishment of variety upon which 
selection needs to work and thus actually prevents the conceptualization of 
change over time. Although in key works, Hannan and Freeman (1977, 933; 
1989, 15) head up passages on population thinking, signaling its importance 
for evolutionary theorizing, this is not to explain it in the terms understood in 
biology. And while their approach does indeed accord with a tractable gen-
eral selection theory (Knudsen 2004), Reydon and Scholz are right to con-
clude that it cannot be described as a Darwinian evolutionary selection 
process.
The following section explains the crucial links between variety and inheri-
tance in the populationist’s definition of an evolving population and prepares 
the analysis here for the role of the replicator-interactor distinction in facilitat-
ing conceptualization of the interlinked processes of natural selection.
Variation, Inheritance, and Darwinian Populations. Evidently, a key failing in 
organizational ecology is the underestimation of the role of variation. To 
understand evolutionary change, we need to pay far more attention to the pro-
cesses that generate and regenerate variation—in other words, variation and 
its inheritance (Mayr 1982). The replenishment (replication and inheritance) 
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of variety and the creation and dispersion of variety (innovation, entrepreneur-
ial activity, and “copying errors”) are all critical aspects of any socioeconomic 
evolutionary story. And this leads here to the complex interrelationships 
among Darwin’s core principles of variation, inheritance, and selection.
In biology, the gene is the heritable entity that explains replication and the 
replenishment of variety in the system. Through sexual reproduction of the 
organism, the gene pool recombines to provide new varieties of organisms in 
each successive generation. Selection then acts on this variety. As Mayr 
(1982, 163) explains, “New gene pools are generated in every generation, 
and evolution takes place because the successful individuals produced by 
these gene pools give rise to the next generation.” The continuous restoration 
of variability is facilitated through the heritable replicating gene. Evidently, 
organizational ecology needs to incorporate a replicating heritable entity. In 
the following evaluation of organizational ecology, Reydon and Scholz 
(2009, 422; my italics) arrive at the issue of inheritance and specify how this 
helps define a Darwinian population:
[The] conception of populations as sets profoundly differs from how biologists 
conceive of the nature of populations and species…from an evolutionary 
perspective, species and populations are not to be understood as sets, classes, or 
aggregates of organisms that belong to the same population because of shared 
properties. Biological populations are usually conceived of as organized systems 
of organisms (e.g., Hull 1980, 322-24; Ghiselin 1997, 15) that interact with each 
other in various ways and are held together in the population by way of various 
mechanisms, such as reproduction, gene flow, social interactions, division of labor, 
mutual protection, intra-and inter-population competition for mates and resources, 
reproductive isolation from other populations, etc.
Thus, in terms of defining the evolving entity, Reydon and Scholz rightly 
observe that structural cohesion, as opposed to shared traits, is the way to 
establish membership of a population in an evolutionary selection process. 
And this rests on the reproductive interactions within the “unit of organiza-
tion” and resulting common descent. In their illustration of the Darwinian 
conceptualization of populations as real entities in nature, conceived of as 
“units of organization,” they explain that “the members (or more accurately, 
parts) of a system are parts of that system only by virtue of their interactions 
with other parts of the system” (2009, 423). This understanding of structural 
cohesion is extremely important and explains why typologically defined pop-
ulations cannot evolve.
It is worth repeating Reydon and Scholz’s citation from the eminent phi-
losopher of biology David Hull (1978, 341), whose notion of “lineage” 
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explains structural cohesion and spells out the significance of reproductive 
and genealogical relations for a definition of Darwinian populations:
The relevant organismal units in evolution are not sets of organisms defined in 
terms of structural similarity but lineages formed by the imperfect copying 
processes of reproduction. Organisms can belong to the same lineage even though 
they are structurally different from other organisms in that lineage. What is more, 
continued changes in structure can take place indefinitely. If evolution is to occur, 
not only can such indefinite structural variation take place but also it must.
Neatly capturing Darwin’s meaning of descent with modification, Hull’s 
lineage concept illustrates the link between replication and inheritance and 
highlights the role of the heritable unit and knowledge transmission in the 
evolutionary process.
In summary, Reydon and Scholz’s critique concurs with the prevailing 
Darwinian view regarding the non-Darwinian status of organizational ecolo-
gy’s selection process. Most welcome about this contribution is its forensic 
examination and clear articulation of the complex ontological reasons for this 
and how these illuminate the theory’s problems. However, as will be argued, 
the authors go on to draw a contentious conclusion about the Darwinian sta-
tus of populations in general (2009, 431):
Our criticism . . . hinges on an ontological matter: the entities that organizational 
ecologists claim participate in organizational evolutionary processes (i.e., 
organizational populations) are not sufficiently similar to the entities that 
participate in biological evolutionary processes, hence the two processes are not 
sufficiently similar to be described by the same model or similar models.
The position here also hinges on ontological issues, not least of which is the 
claim that social evolution is Darwinian. There is now widespread agreement 
about the abstract nature of the principle of natural selection (Okasha 2006). 
In the formulation described as “generalized Darwinism,” Hodgson and 
Knudsen (2010) use the term “complex population systems” to denote the 
kind of populations that are sufficiently similar to those that participate in 
biological evolutionary processes and thus can be described by the same 
Darwinian model:
Complex population systems contain multiple (intentional or non-intentional), 
varied entities that interact with the environment and each other. They face 
immediately scarce resources and struggle to survive, whether through conflict or 
cooperation. They adapt and can pass on information to others, through replication 
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8As far as this author is aware, this has been the only other published challenge to 
Reydon and Scholz’s paper. Although sympathetic to Lemos’s (2009, 474) view 
regarding the moot point of “how thoroughly Darwinian a theory must be to be justly 
labelled a ‘Darwinian’ theory,” this author concurs with Reydon and Scholz’s insis-
tence on the need for a population thinking approach.
9As Scholz and Reydon explain (2010, 506), Lemos defends a Spencerian “survival of 
the fittest” interpretation of evolution, which overlooks the evolutionary significance 
of differential reproduction: “evolution does not consist in the survival of the best, 
but in more reproductive success for the better adapted as compared to the less well 
off.” Correspondingly (507), they disagree that the variation in typologically defined 
populations is significant from a Darwinian evolutionary perspective.
or imitation. Complex population systems are found in both the natural and the 
social domains. An economic example is an industry involving cohesive 
organizational entities such as business firms.
In this formulation, from the highly abstract core principles of variation, 
inheritance, and selection, scholars derive general principles and concepts 
that are sufficiently general to span the common features of both domains. 
However, it is important to observe here that they do not claim “maximal 
generality” for these (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2012). Note that complex pop-
ulation systems are consistent with Reydon and Scholz’s “units of organiza-
tion” as well as with Hull and Ghiselin’s notions of structural cohesion.
3. The Limitations of Reydon and Scholz’s Critique
The view here is that while Reydon and Scholz make many accurate claims, 
their conclusion about organizational populations is contentious because it 
does not appear to take account of the replicator-interactor distinction raised 
in the philosophy of biology that facilitates their conceptualization. This is 
what limits their Darwinian formulation. Rather than just focusing their cri-
tique on organizational ecology’s set-theoretic view of populations, they go 
on to reject the idea that organizational populations in general can be per-
ceived as evolving Darwinian entities (2009, 408, 411).
In a defense of organizational ecology’s Darwinian credentials, Lemos 
(2009) proffered an immediate but ultimately unpersuasive challenge to 
Reydon and Scholz’s critique, based as it was on the resolute view that sets 
can be conceived as real entities.8 This was dismissed by the authors in a 
rejoinder (Scholz and Reydon 2010) where they reasserted the need for a pop-
ulation thinking approach for Darwinian evolutionary selection processes.9
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10For most critics, it is the heavy emphasis on selection that leaves the theory want-
ing. While acknowledging its success as a research program, it is argued that by 
accentuating one particular strand of evolutionary theory, organizational ecology 
ends up presenting a distorted view of organizational phenomena (Baum and Singh 
1994a).
This paper presents a much more robust challenge to Reydon and 
Scholz that disputes their claims about the non-Darwinian status of orga-
nizational ecology and organizational populations in general. Overlooked 
for discussion by both papers is the extensive work on the replicator con-
cept (Sterelny, Smith, and Dickison 1996; Godfrey-Smith 2000) and the 
replicator-interactor distinction (Hull 1981, 1988; Brandon, 1990, 1998; 
Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004, 2008, 2010). Drawing on these and other 
works, the argument presented here is that it is possible to conceptualize 
evolving Darwinian populations providing that they meet the requirement 
for structural cohesion and the inheritance mechanism is appropriately 
specified.
As will be elaborated, the generalized replicator and interactor concepts 
together present an important conceptual tool that untangles the conceptual 
issues raised in Reydon and Scholz’s critique. Through its adoption, adap-
tation and  selection processes are no longer dichotomized, and the evolu-
tionary significance of knowledge transmission in the social realm is 
highlighted.
3.1. Beyond Reydon and Scholz’s Narrow View of Darwinism
From a modern Darwinian perspective, organizational ecology is best 
described as an incomplete or partial evolutionary account (Levinthal 1991; 
Bruderer and Singh 1996) that nonetheless remains compatible with 
Darwinism.10 The main problem with organizational ecology, which derives 
from its downplaying of adaptation in favor of selection, is its lack of an 
inheritance mechanism. Although an important knowledge transmission 
role for routines is acknowledged, this remains undeveloped, and the theo-
ry’s architects admit that they do not attempt to explain adaptation or 
“inheritance” (Hannan and Freeman 1989, 20). This omission renders orga-
nizational ecology an incomplete Darwinian account rather than a non-
Darwinian account as claimed by Reydon and Scholz in their narrow view 
of Darwinism.
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11See Hodgson and Knudsen (2010) on the difference between “subset” selection and 
“successor” selection, where the former removes variation over time and thus eventu-
ally grinds to a halt.
12These developments relate to the established Darwinism, which has long since 
embraced Mendelian genetics and which biologists often call “neo-Darwinism”—
specifically to signal its synthesis in the 1950s with Mendelian genetics. It is impor-
tant here to distinguish this meaning of “neo-Darwinism” from another that tends to 
occur in the social sciences literature where neo-Darwinism has sometimes been used 
pejoratively to refer to genetic determinism or “ultra-Darwinism.”
Relatedly, although it could be argued that, in accordance with general 
selection theory (Price 1995), organizational ecology does present an evolu-
tionary selection process, it is important to observe that this is not the same 
as a Darwinian natural selection process, which notably includes a mecha-
nism to explain the replenishment of variety in the system.11 But again, 
while this also admits a failure to include an inheritance mechanism, it does 
not suggest incompatibility with Darwinism, only an incomplete Darwinian 
account in need of further development.
To be sure, with the decoupling of adaptation and selection, Hannan and 
Freeman’s own narrow reading of Darwinism not only causes problems for 
their theory but also misleadingly sets up Lamarckism and Darwinism as 
false rivals. Indeed, with the evident polarization of evolutionary accounts 
into either “adaptationist” or “selectionist” camps, this view exacerbates 
what has become known as the “adaptation versus selection debate” in 
organization science (Levinthal 1991). The ultimate consequence of this 
false dichotomy is that it precludes a complete causal account for organi-
zation scholars that would permit the integration of deliberation and 
selection.
We now consider these issues through the adjusted lens of a modern gen-
eralized Darwinism approach where it will be shown how the replicator-
interactor distinction provides a way forward for organizational ecologists to 
bring “evolution proper” back into the analysis. Accordingly, it will be shown 
how Reydon and Scholz’s claims turn out to be less decisive.
Overview of Modern Darwinism. Modern Darwinism found its authority and 
formal articulation during the last three decades of the twentieth century,12  
and, as Reydon and Scholz acknowledge, this development began with 
exploration of the theory’s generic nature. By purposefully adopting a gen-
eral approach for analysis of these evolutionary processes, in other words 
separating them from their biological origins, scholars sought to determine 
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13Hull (1981) reflects on the approach of geneticist Richard Lewontin (1970), observ-
ing how the latter first characterizes the evolutionary process and then considers evi-
dence for and against selection at various levels of organization. Hull then explains 
his own distinctive approach, which, in contrast, begins by focusing on the evolution-
ary process itself, investigating its general characteristics, and only then consider-
ing which entities have the requisite characteristics to function in the evolutionary 
process.
14Hodgson and Knudsen (2012, 609) state, “In making the claim (which we share 
with Gers and Godfrey-Smith) that social evolution is Darwinian, we are interested 
in establishing principles and concepts of sufficient but not maximal generality. The 
principles and concepts must be sufficiently general to span the key common features 
of biological and social evolution, but they need not encompass any conceivable defi-
nition of evolutionary processes (and implied phenomena) in these domains.”
the general principles of natural selection and resolve the enduring unit-of-
selection debate (Lewontin 1970; Hull 1980, 1981).13
While the unit-of-selection debate has notably shifted in focus since 
the 1980s and continues unresolved (Okasha 2006), from these earlier 
developments in the philosophy of biology emerged Hull’s (1988) influ-
ential “replicator” and “interactor” concepts: used to denote the gene and 
the organism in biology and the routine and organization in the socioeco-
nomic realm. Seemingly discounted by Reydon and Scholz, these con-
cepts have helped clarify the complex processes involved in natural 
selection and indeed have now become “generalized terms” (Brandon, 
1990). As previously indicated, however, it is important to stress that the 
replicator and interactor concepts, as originally conceived and recently 
developed, are of more limited generality than the core principles of 
inheritance and selection. There is no attempt, for example, to use the 
replicator concept as a basis for a wholly general theory of evolution 
(Hodgson and Knudsen 2012).14
The Replicator-Interactor Distinction. Evolutionists were divided over the true 
unit of selection. However, Hull (1981) eventually discerned that units and 
levels had become conflated in the debate and, following Mayr (1978), deter-
mined that selection was in fact a “two-step” process that involved a replicat-
ing entity and an interacting entity. In other words, he determined that there 
was a functional distinction between these entities. Illustrating the nature of 
the debate and the import of his generalized replicator and interactor termi-
nology, Hull (2001, 61) explains the linguistic confusion:
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15Mayr (1988, 98) explains, “Natural selection proper is only the second stage of a 
two-step process. The first step consists of the production of variation in every genera-
tion, that is, of suitable genetic or phenotypic variants that can serve as the material of 
selection, and this will then be exposed to the process of selection. This first step of 
variation is completely independent of the actual selection process, and yet selection 
would not be possible without the continuous restoration of variability.”
When Dawkins says that genes are the units of selection, he means replication. 
Genes are the primary units of replication and “hence” selection. When others 
such as Mayr say that organisms are the primary focus of selection, they mean 
environmental interaction. In gene-based biological evolution, organisms are the 
primary units of environmental interaction and “hence” selection.
The conceptual clarification of this “indirect selection” of genes provides 
understanding of the apportioned location of causality in the natural selection 
process. This was a major development in the philosophy of biology, for as 
well as demonstrating that selection is a two-step process15 and clarifying 
what happens at each level of the organizational hierarchy, it established the 
important distinction, or “dual aspect” nature, of the primary unit of selection 
(Mayr 1988), otherwise known as the organism or “primary interactor” (Hull 
1988). Furthermore, this replictor-interactor distinction presents an invalu-
able conceptual tool for organizational ecologists. Premised on the popula-
tion thinking perspective and providing expression of a replicating heritable 
unit for knowledge transmission, it also asserts structural cohesion, as defined 
earlier, for membership of an evolutionary population.
The replicator is defined by Hull (1988, 408) as “an entity that passes on 
its structure largely intact in successive replications,” and it is hosted by an 
interactor. The interactor is defined as “an entity that directly interacts as a 
cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction 
causes replication to be differential.” These are the entities that function 
within the selection process and their combination (in terms of an interactor 
composed of replicators) amounts to what we generally think of as the pri-
mary interactor or unit of selection. In biology, this is the organism, and in the 
business world, this is the organization or the firm.
As indicated, these terms were inspired by the replicating function of the 
genotype and the interacting function of the phenotype. In biology, the geno-
type is understood as the genetic composition of an organism, and the pheno-
type is its developed characteristics or capacities. For social scientists, habits, 
rules, and organizational routines are the paradigmatic (“social”) replicators, 
in other words, the encoding entity (Aldrich 1999; Hodgson and Knudsen 
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16Indeed, it satisfies their own requirements regarding “membership of a system” 
(Reydon and Schulz 2009, 423).
17“Ultimately, relations among organisms . . . provide the glue, the spatial and tempo-
ral cohesion, to bind individual organisms together into population wholes” (Gannett 
2003, cited in Reydon and Scholz 2009, 425).
2004, 2006a), while groups or organizations are the paradigmatic (“social”) 
interactors, characterized and developed by the replicators of which they are 
composed, which interact with their respective environments and compete 
for scarce resources.
With the replicator-interactor distinction, Hull (1988, 409) defines the 
selection process as “a process in which the differential extinction and prolif-
eration of interactors cause the differential perpetuation of the relevant repli-
cators.” Accordingly, in the socioeconomic domain, there will be fitness 
differences among the various heritable organizational routines. The differ-
ential proliferation of the most successful firms will in turn cause the per-
petuation of their organizational routines. Through the “knowledge retaining” 
replicating routines, the knowledge concerning adaptive solutions to survival 
problems are thereby retained and passed on.
Thus, as suggested, with this conceptual apparatus, it is now possible for 
organization ecologists to develop a framework to model an evolving 
Darwinian population. These conceptual advances established the functional 
difference between units and levels, properly situated the heritable unit, and 
clearly defined the evolving entity. From this perspective, it is shown that 
Reydon and Scholz’s dismissal of Darwinian populations in the social realm 
is unfounded.
To be sure, following Hull (1978) and Gannett (2003) whom Reydon and 
Scholz notably cite as authorities on this issue, the replicator-interactor dis-
tinction clearly enables conceptualization of an evolving population, for 
example, in relation to inheritance, through what Hull describes as structural 
cohesion (defined in terms of common descent or lineages)16  or what Gannett 
describes as the binding factor of reproductive cohesion.17  Again, following 
Hull (1988), whom Reydon and Scholz notably do not consult on this particu-
lar issue, we have a clear definition of an evolutionary selection process that 
concurs with their own Darwinian interpretation but decisively incorporates 
the replicator-interactor distinction that facilitates conceptualization of an 
inheritance mechanism.
In their critique of organizational ecology’s selection process, Reydon and 
Scholz argue that “another mechanism would be required to ensure that later-
generation organizations resemble successful earlier-generation organizations” 
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18The term successor selection is their own: “subset selection is very different from 
the concept of successor selection—which was part of Darwin’s great achievement—
where offspring are not subsets of parents. Successor selection involves replication, 
whereas subset selection is a simple elimination process” (2010, 94).
19See Brandon (1998), Godfrey-Smith (2006, 2009), and Hodgson and Knudsen (2010).
(2009, 428). The heritability of traits, they observe, “is a necessary requirement 
for evolution to occur.” It is argued here that these calls for due attention to be 
paid to the inheritance mechanism and the reproductive and genealogical rela-
tions that determine membership of a Darwinian population are convincingly 
addressed through adoption of the replicator-interactor conceptual apparatus. 
This is underlined in a recent definition of the Darwinian selection process 
offered by Hodgson and Knudsen (2010, 92):
Selection involves an anterior set of entities that is somehow being transformed 
into a posterior set, where all members of the posterior set are sufficiently similar 
to some members of the anterior set, and where the resulting frequencies of 
posterior entities are correlated positively and causally with their fitness in the 
environmental context. The transformation from the anterior to the posterior set is 
caused by the entities’ interaction within a particular environment.
Modern Darwinism is clear on what it defines as a dynamic evolutionary 
selection process. In this scientific usage of selection, population thinking is 
assumed; structural or reproductive cohesiveness is required; and selection 
involves an interacting entity that embodies a replicating entity. This is quite 
different from and not to be confused with the common understanding of 
selection that simply refers to choice. An important body of literature that 
explores the technical definition of selection is usefully summarized by 
Hodgson and Knudsen, who, in their discussion of the principle of selection, 
highlight the important difference between general “subset” selection (Price 
1995) and evolutionary “successor selection.”18
Now established in biology, the idea of social replicators and interactors 
has since been variously deployed by scholars in organization sciences 
(Baum 2002), evolutionary economics (Hodgson and Knudsen 2004, 
2006a, 2006b), evolutionary anthropology (Hull, Langham, and Glenn 
2001), and memetics (Aunger 2000). While a rich body of work has emerged 
on general definitions of replication (Sterelny et al. 1996; Godfrey-Smith 
2000; Sperber 2000), scholars continue to explore the viability of candidate 
social replicators (e.g., habits, routines, and rules) and social interactors 
(e.g., groups, organizations, and institutions).19
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20Recall that in organization science, the interlinked processes of adaptation and 
selection have become separated partly due to the misapprehension that they denoted 
Lamarckian or Darwinian evolution.
Significantly, the replicator-interactor distinction is implicit in Nelson and 
Winter’s (1982) highly influential evolutionary economics, where they equate 
routines with genes and firms with organisms; it is also present in the promi-
nent evolutionary approach of Howard Aldrich (1999) in Organizations 
Evolving. Moreover, as will be discussed in section 5, the distinction is present 
in Hannan and Freeman’s (1989) Organizational Ecology—if only in embry-
onic form. While these authors do not use the replicator-interactor terms in 
these works and their evolutionary interpretations suffer their own particular 
problems of intractability or incompleteness (Dollimore 2006), it is neverthe-
less apparent in their respective accounts that at some level they are aware of 
this important distinction and its causal role in the evolutionary process.
Lamarckism and Darwinism. Indeed, for these and all evolutionary scholars in 
business economics and organization sciences, the challenge remains to con-
struct a more complete evolutionary account that comprises Darwinian selec-
tion but also somehow accounts for the “Lamarckian” deliberative or 
intentional behavior that characterizes the social world. This very real possi-
bility brings the present discussion to other conceptual advances in evolu-
tionary theory especially relevant to organizational ecology and its 
resurrection as a viable Darwinian evolutionary model—that is, reconcilia-
tion of Darwinism with Lamarckism and consequent resolution of the adap-
tation-versus-selection debate in organization science.20 It will be seen here 
how the replicator-interactor tool addresses the conceptual problem at the 
center of this controversy.
It has been established, contrary to a widespread belief, that Lamarckism 
and Darwinism are not rival or mutually exclusive theories (Mayr 1978; Hull 
1982; Dawkins 1986). The notion of acquired character inheritance, long 
since dismissed in biology, though notably not denied by Darwin (Mayr 
1976), is now shown to be theoretically possible. Indeed, the same genotype-
phenotype distinction necessary to explain Darwinian inheritance in the 
biotic world also facilitates conceptualization of a Lamarckian inheritance 
process in the social domain through the replicator-interactor distinction. 
This permits articulation of same-generational change for organizational 
ecology.
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21This is different to the kind of replication involved in infection or contagion, where 
properties such as germs or fleas (or ideas in social world) are “passed on” from one 
interactor to another but do not affect the replicators of the second interactor. See 
Hodgson and Knudsen (2010) for elaboration.
In other words, in contrast to the biological domain where phenotypic 
change (like a broken limb or cosmetic surgery) cannot affect the genotype, 
same-generation knowledge transmission from organizations to their organi-
zational routines (as firms learn and adapt to changing business environ-
ments) is now conceptually as well as empirically viable. For Lamarckian 
acquired character inheritance to work, it requires a mechanism that permits 
the encoding of acquired traits in a replicator that is passed on to the next 
generation. Conceptualization of this kind of knowledge transmission is only 
possible with the replicator-interactor distinction.21
But it is also clear that Lamarckism, in common with self-organization 
theory, cannot stand alone as an evolutionary theory, because ultimately it 
needs a Darwinian selection process to work (Dawkins 1986; Hodgson 2001, 
Knudsen 2001). There are important gaps in the Lamarckism explanation. 
For example, it fails to explain why only advantageous adaptations are inher-
ited and not disadvantageous ones: something that can only be explained 
through a Darwinian selection process. Relatedly, at a more fundamental 
level, it fails to explain why organisms try to adapt to their environments. In 
other words, how is intentionality explained in the social arena? It is sug-
gested that such gaps need to be filled by a Darwinian or other explanation 
(Dawkins 1983, 1986).
An important body of work that builds on the aforementioned advances in 
philosophy of biology demonstrates how these conceptual gaps are addressed 
within modern Darwinism (Hodgson and Knudsen 2006b; Stoelhorst 2008; 
Aldrich et al. 2008). In the “generalized Darwinism” formulation, proponents 
demonstrate how the metatheoretical framework of an abstract generalized 
Darwinism accommodates auxiliary, domain-specific explanations, such as 
the Lamarckian inheritance required in socioeconomic accounts where both 
deliberation and selection need to be explained for a complete causal story. 
Following a long but neglected intellectual tradition and grounded in the 
population thinking approach, generalized Darwinism upholds that the core 
principles of variation, inheritance, and selection are general principles that 
govern the evolution of all complex open systems that share fundamental 
ontological similarities.
We are reminded that Darwin (1859, 1871, 1874) himself predicted the 
general application of natural selection, for example, in relation to customs, 
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22Note that generalized Darwinism does not claim to be a complete theory of every-
thing and is not to be confused with “Universal Darwinism” (Dawkins 1983), which 
suggests universal validity for the theory.
23Ziman (2002) reflects the views of many in organization science: “The key fac-
tor in widening the field of application of evolutionary reasoning is the realization 
(Campbell 1974) that this is a general mode of historical change, of which the evolu-
tion of biological organisms is only one example.”
language, and morals; that his contemporaries endorsed it (Bagehot 1872; 
Ritchie 1889, 1896); and that a host of others across a range of disciplines 
have since reinforced its application beyond the realms of biology (Veblen 
1898; Campbell 1965; Toulmin 1972; Dennett 1995; Wilson 2002).
The wider relevance of these theoretical developments for the social 
domain is apparent in many studies where it has been demonstrated 
unequivocally that social evolution is both Lamarckian and Darwinian 
(Boyd and Richerson 1985; Metcalfe 1998; Hodgson and Knudsen 2006b). 
Ironically, even the polarization of the socioeconomic literature into 
Lamarckian or Darwinian accounts testifies to this, with some scholars per-
ceiving a Lamarckian evolutionary story in the social realm while their 
colleagues perceive a Darwinian one. Undoubtedly, the theoretical accom-
modation of Lamarckian inheritance is a key aspect of generalized 
Darwinism that should not be overlooked by organizational ecologists. 
Indeed, it is poised to considerably improve their analytical approach. If 
organizational ecology is to articulate an inheritance mechanism, which it 
evidently needs to do to express an evolutionary selection process, it needs 
both Lamarckism and the metatheoretical framework of generalized 
Darwinism.22
The Question of Ontology and Darwinian Populations. It is evident that “evolu-
tionary theory is no longer dogmatically committed to the view that there can 
only be individual or gene selection” (Vromen 2001) or that it is only relevant 
to the biotic world (Winter 1987).23 This realization, together with the newly 
acquired conceptual apparatus, has informed an exciting raft of work in evo-
lutionary economics and organization studies where scholars have revived 
efforts in this direction by their evolutionary forebears. As indicated in the 
previous section, the question of ontology and Darwinian populations has not 
been overlooked here.
Drawing on the advances in philosophy of biology outlined so far, it has 
been shown by evolutionary economists how generalized Darwinism shifts 
the theoretical approach beyond mere analogy and metaphor toward the more 
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24Correspondingly, generalized Darwinism makes absolutely clear that there are 
no allusions to eugenics, genetic-determinism, or, indeed, any of the racist, impe-
rialist, or sexist ideologies that have misleadingly become associated with name of 
Darwin (Hodgson 2004). Darwinism is about the application of general principles, 
an approach that assumes a Darwinian ontology and has no need for a reductionist 
methodology.
25Many social scientists already acknowledge this point, as noted by Baum and Singh 
(1994b, 10): “fortunately, Darwin’s idea of evolution—descent with modification—is 
not tied to particular features of biological inheritance (Boyd and Richerson 1985; 
Campbell 1965; Hannan and Freeman 1989; Hull 1988). Natural selection is a very 
general mechanism.”
analytically tractable platform of a Darwinian social ontology (Hodgson 
2002). Most important for skeptical social scientists, with the realization that 
Darwinism is not domain specific, that it has moved beyond analogy and is a 
general abstract theory, it becomes apparent that social phenomena are not 
being analyzed in terms of biological phenomena, nor is biology determining 
the social research agenda.24 In a passage from Darwin’s Conjecture (2010, 
21), Hodgson and Knudsen elaborate on the meaning of ontological 
communality:
Generalized Darwinism relies on the claim of common abstract features in both 
the social and the biological world; it is essentially a contention of a degree of 
ontological communality, at a high level of abstraction and not at the level of 
detail. This communality is captured by concepts such as replication and selection, 
which are defined as precisely and meaningfully as possible but in a highly general 
and abstract sense.
Responding to critics (Witt 2004; Cordes 2006), proponents of general-
ized Darwinism stress that the detail about entities and their particular mech-
anisms will inevitably vary from one domain to another, since what happens 
in the social domain is clearly quite different from what happens in the bio-
logical domain. It is argued that this structural feature underlines the point 
that Darwinism does not mean that the analysis of social evolution will be 
dictated or skewed by a biological perspective or agenda.25
The important point to observe here is that there are fundamental onto-
logical similarities among all complex evolving systems, and, from the gen-
eralized Darwinian perspective, it is possible to conceive of Darwinian 
entities and processes operating in the social domain. Consider the complex 
evolving industries studied by organizational ecologists. These industry 
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populations will typically comprise a variety of new and existing firms that 
will in turn comprise a host of enduring, developing, and novel routines. The 
economic selection process acts on successive generations of this variety and 
results in the differential survival of firms competing within that industry. 
The resulting pool of heritable replicating routines are those that come to 
characterize or define the industry in each period.
Evidently grounded on the core principles of variation, inheritance, and 
selection and notably incorporating the replicator-interactor distinction, 
Hodgson and Knudsen offer a definition of generalized Darwinism that cap-
tures the nature of these Darwinian populations (2010, 238):
Darwinism is a general theoretical framework for understanding evolution in 
complex population systems, involving the inheritance of replicator instructions 
by individual units, a variation of replicators and interactors, and a process of 
selection of the consequent interactors in a population.
Contrary to Reydon and Scholz, as illustrated above and in preceding sec-
tions, it evidently is possible to conceptualize evolving Darwinian popula-
tions in the socioeconomic domain, providing that the inheritance mechanism 
is appropriately specified. Furthermore, through the same replicator-interac-
tor distinction, adaptation and selection are shown to be reconciled in the 
socioeconomic sphere. Before elaborating on how the conceptual apparatus 
might be applied to rescue organizational ecology, the analysis briefly con-
siders the importance of replication (inheritance) and knowledge transmis-
sion for the socioeconomic realm.
4. Darwinian Selection and Knowledge 
Transmission
In both the natural world and the social world, all agree that it is not possible 
to have an evolutionary selection process without an inheritance mecha-
nism. Any adequate understanding of selection in the social world requires 
specification of the mechanisms that bring about correlations in cultural 
traits in successive generations (Hull 2000, 54). As Metcalfe (1987, 57) 
observes, it is a crude error to interpret the evolutionary argument solely in 
terms of selection. Relating this to the socioeconomic domain, he explains 
elsewhere (2004) the importance of also accounting for what he calls 
“upward causation,” and he cautions that in separating selection from firm-
level developmental processes,26 theorists risk missing a major element of 
understanding.
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26What organization scholars refer to as “adaptive” processes. Metcalfe is calling for 
the proper (Darwinian) marrying of selection and adaptation in evolutionary accounts.
27In an account where routines are portrayed as genes, Nelson and Winter (1982, 
400) posit an organization-level search process that involves higher-level rou-
tines evaluating, modifying, or replacing current routines. For Metcalfe, this takes 
appropriate account of “bottom-up” causality within an evolutionary selection 
process.
28Nelson and Winter’s account (which they insist on describing as Lamarckian) is 
not without its problems. Close reading reveals confusion between levels and units 
of selection in articulation of the search process. However, as with organizational 
ecology, it is suggested here that these conceptual issues can be reconciled through 
the application of generalized Darwinism and adoption of the replicator-interactor 
distinction in a multilevel selection process.
Underlining the point that it is (a) variety that drives economic evolution 
and (b) technological innovation that feeds variety, Metcalfe (1987, 64) 
points instructively to the more complete evolutionary account offered by 
Nelson and Winter. In praise of their models of “search” behavior, he observes 
that their theory usefully accounts for the behaviors that generate the variety 
on which selection operates, and applauds what he calls their insightful 
micro-to-macro-style Darwinian selection account,27 which appropriately 
embraces Lamarckian inheritance:28
One of the central lessons of the Nelson and Winter world view is the need to build 
a theory of growth in a bottom up fashion with due attention paid to the emergence 
of constraints at higher levels of aggregation.
Also underlining this point, organization scholars Baum and Singh (1994a, 
5) cite a host of studies demonstrating that organizations can and do change, 
and they stress that these changes are important to understanding what orga-
nizations do as individuals and as populations. Indeed, they too lament the 
one-sided selectionist perspective of organizational ecology and see this as 
a major area of research for evolutionary theorists in the socioeconomic 
domain (6):
By and large, organizational ecologists have not attempted to link ecological 
processes of interaction and genealogical processes of replication. Consequently we 
still know very little about the other side of the evolutionary process—the structures 
of organizational inheritance and transmission (Baum 1989). How are organizational 
structures and practices perpetuated through time? What is inherited and how?
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29See Witt (2004, 2008) and Cordes (2006).
30See Aldrich et al. (2008).
The view here is that in the absence of an adequate evolutionary frame-
work that takes proper account of knowledge transmission and the adaptive 
imperative of organizations, our ignorance of the evolution of socioeco-
nomic populations is destined to remain the same. While generalized 
Darwinism is not without its critics29 and proponents acknowledge concep-
tual and empirical work yet to be accomplished for a scientific approach 
still in its infancy,30  embracing as it does, the foremost theoretical and 
conceptual advances in philosophy of biology, it nevertheless offers for the 
socioeconomic domain the promise of a more complete evolutionary 
approach with greater explanatory potential. In the following section, rather 
than follow Reydon and Scholz’s preemptive dismissal, we now consider 
what organizational ecology might look like from a modern, generalized 
Darwinian perspective.
5. The Way Forward for Organizational Ecologists
For Reydon and Scholz (2009, 409), “it must be shown that the entities under 
consideration in a particular research program actually meet the requirements 
of Darwinian evolution to occur.” This paper argues that it is possible to 
achieve this and suggests a way forward for organizational ecologists.
In the overview of pertinent developments in the philosophy of biology 
and elsewhere, the preceding sections have made the argument that it is pos-
sible to conceptualize Darwinian entities and processes in the social arena. 
Furthermore, it is claimed that the conceptual apparatus, in the form of the 
replicator-interactor distinction, now exists to enable organizational ecolo-
gists to develop a more complete Darwinian program. Supporting the view 
here that organizational ecology is an incomplete Darwinian approach is the 
observation that its selection process is not incompatible with Darwinism 
and, furthermore, that an unexpressed inheritance mechanism resides in the 
theory. Elaborating on this claim, the following analysis shows how this 
primes organizational ecology for the necessary theoretical development, and 
it sketches out how, by using the replicator-interactor distinction, organiza-
tional ecology can account for adaptation and selection effects and thereby 
then claim to be a complete Darwinian research program.
It is agreed here that organizational ecology lacks an adequate explanation 
of diversity. There is a failure, for example, to identify an “organizational 
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31Moreover, a multilevel selection process might be suggested with Hannan and 
Freeman’s “set of rules” being conceived of as a higher-level set of routines within a 
nested hierarchy of interactors. In other words, this “group” could comprise another 
interactor—providing that the group acts as a cohesive whole, as specified in Hull’s 
(1988) definition of an interactor.
generation” or a “social vehicle” for transmitting or inheriting traits (McKelvey 
1982). Yet, a close review of its explananda reveals that Darwinian inheritance 
is nonetheless assumed in the theory.
Although Hannan and Freeman rejected the notion of Lamarckian inheri-
tance, it is important to note that their work represents an empirical rather 
than a theoretical rejection of Lamarckism. Indeed, there is nothing in their 
theory that suggests that Lamarckian inheritance is impossible in principle. 
Moreover, they do not deny that organizations change, only that the change 
cannot account for the evolutionary change manifested at the population 
level. Also, they do not deny this gap in their theory but declare their inability 
to specify a transmission process, and, indeed, they signal this as an area for 
future research. The point is that there is clearly scope for the productive 
development of their theory.
This includes evidence of the core Darwinian principles lying dormant 
in the theory as well as an embryonic replicator. While selection unques-
tionably dominates, an inheritance mechanism is suggested in the concept 
of “structural inertia” and in Hannan and Freeman’s treatment of their cen-
tral interact ing entity, the “relatively inert” organizational form that is 
described as responding relatively slowly to threats and opportunities in the 
environment (Hannan and Freeman 1989, 70). Continuity and replication of 
form are thus evidently assumed in organizational ecology. Also, in Hannan 
and Freeman’s description of organizations as having “high inertia both in 
the sets of routines employed and in the set of rules used to switch between 
routines” (76), a replicator and interactor relationship can be discerned that 
is not inconsistent with Hull’s distinction.31 Organizations here are evi-
dently composed of routines that affect organizational form. The inertial 
principle and recognition of “faithfully reproducing structures that resist 
transformation” (Hannan 2005, 59) imply replication, though not, of course, 
transformation. There is no heritability of traits, or “lineage,” with preced-
ing forms. As previously noted, the selection process here is subset selec-
tion, not “successor” selection.
While Hannan and Freeman stress that they shift the analysis to the level of 
the population, it is clear that the unit of selection is the organization and that 
the effects of selection processes are manifested at the population level. This is 
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where the interactor resides in the theory, in the shape of the organization. 
Furthermore, while their selectionist account is rooted in typological essential-
ism, it is evident that there is an appreciation in the theory of the importance 
of variation for an evolutionary explanation; variety is assumed to be preexist-
ing, for example, in the births and foundings of new businesses.
Organizational ecology is more compatible with Darwinism than first 
appearances might suggest. However, for a more complete and realistic 
account of organizational change and diversity, it is suggested here that it 
needs a reorientation back to the organization as the focus of analysis and 
conceived of as the primary interactor. This would not render the theory 
“adaptationist” but, with the adoption of the replicator-interactor distinction, 
would instead enable the conceptualization of a selection process that 
accounts for inheritance. Of course, in the socioeconomic domain, this would 
be a Lamarckian inheritance mechanism, since it is the notion of acquired 
character inheritance that best describes the intentional behavior and same-
generational change observed in this domain. As described earlier, a 
Lamarckian inheritance mechanism is “nested” in the metatheoretical frame-
work of generalized Darwinism.
Thus, in addition to the exploration of “vital rates” (i.e., births, deaths, 
exits), attempts should be made by researchers to gather data at the organiza-
tional level. Attempts should be made, for example, to identify the character-
istics in individual firms that contribute to fitness in the population under 
study and assess the relative importance of these as selection criteria. 
Attention should be paid to the nature and quality of the firm’s routines; to 
their emergence, stabilization, and disruption; and to their effects on the orga-
nization’s development and growth.
The crucial point here is that organizational ecologists need to recognize 
that adaptation and selection are intertwined, not separate, evolutionary pro-
cesses. It is correct that adaptation at the population level is the outcome of a 
selection process, but for an evolutionary explanation of diversity, we must 
include explanation of the production and replenishment of the variety upon 
which selection operates. In short, we need to include a replicating heritable 
entity, and the theory must be grounded in the Darwinian population thinking 
perspective. The organizational routine is the candidate encoding entity in the 
socioeconomic arena.
By constructing a theory that explicitly models replication and inheritance 
processes, organizational ecologists will be able to claim a proper Darwinian 
evolutionary selection process. The “peculiar duality” (Mayr 1988) of 
Darwinian selection that explains the all-important continuous restoration of 
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32For example, in economics, how much variety is desirable or sustainable in a par-
ticular industry? Is limited variety an indicator of competition or monopolistic prac-
tices? And, relatedly, should variety be encouraged or prevented for the health of the 
general economy?
variety is perfectly captured in the replicator-interactor distinction where dif-
ferential selection of interactors leads to the selection of heritable replicators. 
Adoption of this conceptual tool provides organizational ecologists with the 
mechanism that it needs to explain diversity.
Returning to Reydon and Scholz’s central criticism, in facilitating the 
aforementioned, organizational ecology clearly needs to rethink its concep-
tion of variety and its inheritance and shift to a population thinking approach. 
Population thinking has direct relevance for the analysis of all open-ended 
socioeconomic systems where scholars need to make sense of the prevailing 
variety and where ultimately there are policy implications.32 Metcalfe (1987, 
56), who highlighted its significance for economics, explains that the “the 
shift from analyzing ideal cases to examining frequencies and their distribu-
tion is central to the elaboration of an evolutionary perspective.” As demon-
strated earlier, evolutionary selection processes simply cannot be articulated 
in a schema constructed around typological essentialism, and researchers 
must account for the processes that generate and regenerate variation—in 
other words, the replication and inheritance of innovation, entrepreneurial 
activity, and “copying errors.” The evolutionary significance of knowledge 
transmission cannot be underestimated.
The aforementioned sketch of the formulation of a revised theoretical 
framework for organizational ecology is just that, with insufficient space 
here for elaboration. It does not underestimate the vast methodological 
challenges confronting researchers contemplating its possible integration 
into their research design. However, it does at least point toward the kind of 
theoretical framework that needs to be considered by social scientists seek-
ing to develop a more complete Darwinian evolutionary research program, 
one that accounts for changes in organizational form that result from the 
intertwined processes of adaptation (including learning and the intentional 
decision making of organizational leaders) and evolutionary selection. And 
so, in response to Lemos’s (2009) final musings where he ponders the 
Darwinian research program and a perceived problem with the accommo-
dation of intentionality, the view here is that Darwinism is assuredly not an 
“unnecessary extravagance.”
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33See Baum and Singh (1994a, 1994b) and Laurent and Nightingale (2001). See also 
Dobrev, van Witteloostuijn, and Baum (2006), who explore the development of theory 
and empirical evidence at the interface of strategy management and organizational 
ecology, at what they call the “inertia-flexibility nexus.”
34See Witt (2004, 2008), Vromen (2004), and Hodgson and Knudsen (2008, 2012).
35Working, for example, on the refinement of the replicator and interactor definitions 
and on the identification of what entities in the living world meet these definitions 
(Hodgson and Knudsen 2004, 2006b, 2010).
36Collaborators acknowledge that generalized Darwinism is still in its infancy as a 
research program (Aldrich et al. 2008).
6. Conclusion
The contention here is that Reydon and Scholz’s assertion about the non-
Darwinian status of organizational populations is unfortunate and mislead-
ing. Although this may be true of the organizational populations discussed by 
Hannan and collaborators in organizational ecology, it is important to stress 
that Reydon and Scholz cannot make this claim about organizational popula-
tions in general. Significantly, while Reydon and Scholz (2009, 411) acknowl-
edge the possibility of the broader application of Darwin’s theory and indeed 
discuss the required conditions, they do not discuss the replicator-interactor 
distinction that facilitates developments in this direction.
Misunderstandings about the explanatory scope of Darwin’s theory are 
rife among social scientists where biophobia has led to the trained incompe-
tence of social scientists (Ellis 1996) and where many scholars remain igno-
rant about modern Darwinian theory (Jablonka and Ziman 2000). As 
highlighted here in discussions on population thinking and the replicator-
interactor distinction, foundational aspects of Darwinian theory are still not 
generally understood and the modern generalized terms not widely known. It 
is therefore very important, if we are to move forward with the development 
of a viable evolutionary theory for the socioeconomic realm, to be clear about 
what is and what is not possible in this regard. Accordingly, this paper has 
attempted to untangle some of the conceptual issues that have thwarted its 
realization.
Space does not permit adequate coverage here of the numerous quality 
contributions to this topic in the evolutionary economics and organization 
science literature.33 Suffice to state that productive exchanges continue to 
progress the agenda among evolutionary scholars who continue to debate 
theoretical applications34 and work on the elucidation of general principles 
and definitions of terms.35 While considerable work remains to be done for 
the establishment of a viable and refutable evolutionary model,36 there is 
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widespread agreement on the need for researchers to undertake more empiri-
cal studies to aid this process.
It is now thirty years since organizational ecologists spearheaded the vast 
research program on selection dynamics, and it is high time that researchers 
took account of the evolutionary significance of knowledge transmission. 
Adaptation and selection need no longer be dichotomized. It is argued here 
and elsewhere (Dobrev, van Witteloostuijn, and Baum 2006; Hodgson and 
Knudsen 2010) that researchers have much to gain in merging the rich body 
of work in organizational ecology with the complementary stream of empiri-
cal studies focused on strategic management and the role of organizational 
routines in business organizations (Becker 2008). Given that the conceptual 
apparatus now exists to construct the necessary theoretical models, research-
ers are evidently well placed to exploit these complementary theoretical and 
empirical advances for the productive development of a tractable and com-
plete Darwinian research program.
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